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Stephanie Hoffert
The charities that soothe and heal and bless
are scattered at the feet of man like flowers.
William Wordsworth, The Excursion1
I. Introduction
Throughout recorded history, man has relied upon the good works of his fel-
low man to support those left behind by the collective endeavor. 2 As a result,
charitable organizations hold a special place in society. Because they find
strength in the number of their members, charitable organizations have "the en-
ergy, the vision, the drive, the tenacity," that individual philanthropists and re-
formers may not possess.3 They have proved themselves agents of change at
home and abroad.4
As such, charitable organizations have been unwelcome in countries with non-
democratic forms of government.5 The People's Republic of China is one such
country. The Cultural Revolution eliminated nearly all of the country's charita-
ble institutions for a period of over twelve years, ending in 1978.6 Afterward, the
Chinese government established a handful of closely controlled nongovernmental
organizations to facilitate the receipt of international aid and cooperation. 7 Over
the past ten years, these and other Chinese organizations have undergone signifi-
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I WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, THE ExCURSION (Liver Pool Univ. Pr. 2004) (1814).
2 For instance, Leviticus 23:22, thought to be written in the 6th century B.C., provides that "[w]hen
you reap the harvest of your land ... you shall not pick your vineyard bare, nor gather up the grapes that
have fallen. These things you shall leave for the poor and the alien."
3 LOWELL W. LIVEZEY, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IDEAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 19
(1998).
4 Id. at 28 (citing Puritans, Quakers, and abolitionist societies as "modem organizations of political
dissent" that acted "for explicitly egalitarian and revolutionary change"); see also REPORT TO CONGRESS
AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR ON GOVERNANCE, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.NonprofitPanel.org (follow "final report" hyperlink; then follow "final report" hyper-
link) (last visited Oct. 22, 2005) [hereinafter PANEL ON THE NoN-PRoFIrr SECTOR] (describing the rapid
expansion of the nonprofit sector in the colonial and revolutionary periods, as noted by Alexis de To-
queville in 1831, as differentiating the United States from Europe and noting the sector's development
into integral community institutions such as libraries, local schools and 911 services).
5 See generally LIVEZEY, supra note 3, at 19-34.
6 Deng Guosheng, NGO's Come of Age, BEIJING REVIEW, Apr. 1, 2004, at 28.
7 Id.
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cant changes in functional purpose and governance, moving in lockstep with
China's transformation to a limited market economy. 8
In the United States, by contrast, activities of volunteer organizations first ap-
peared in the form of services provided by religious societies.9 With the growth
of a strong market economy, these services gave rise "to the 'market failure'
theory of volunteer organizations, to the view that voluntary organizations have
their raison d'etre in the failure of the market to meet the needs that they are
established to meet."' 0 Some scholars within the United States also view volun-
tary organizations as mediators between individuals and the mass society.1' "As
'mediating structures' they both give the individual access to institutions in order
to claim the society's benefits more effectively, and provide space for individuals
to retreat from society, better to fulfill the values and experience the customs that
are not shared by society at large."1 2 It is difficult to overstate the prevalence in
the United States of groups tailored to serve these purposes. In 2003, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") master file contained information on 1.6 million tax-
exempt organizations.13 In fiscal year 2000, these organizations held over two
trillion dollars in assets and reported over nine hundred billion dollars in
revenues. 14
Both the United States and China are on the cusp of major changes in govern-
mental regulation of charitable organizations. As China moves forward with the
marketization of its socialist economy, the use of nonprofit organizations for both
mediation and alleviation of market failure has become increasingly important.
Toward that end, China's State Council has enacted a law describing the role and
governance of charitable foundations in China. The United States, on the other
hand, has a fully developed charitable law, but it is one that the government has
considered amending to discourage instances of fraud and self-dealing that have
recently come to light.' 5 This article seeks to compare and contrast the two sys-
tems with an eye toward informing the work of scholars and policy-makers inter-
ested in the governance of charitable organizations.
8 See id.
9 LivEzEY, supra note 3, at 29-30.
10 Id.
I I d. at 33.
12 Id.
13 STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT LAW RELATING TO CHARITA-
BLE AND OTHER EXEMPT ORG. AND STATISTICAL INFO. REGARDING GROWTH AND OVERSIGHT OF THE
TAx-EXEMPT SECTOR, JCX-44-04, at 1 (June 22, 2004) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION].
14 See id.
15 See Sen. Max Baucus, Baucus Calls Behavior of Some Charities "Unacceptable," TAX NOTES
TODAY 121-42 (June 23, 2004) [hereinafter Baucus Remarks].
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II. Recent History in Charitable China
A. The Social Backdrop
China's recent history has been one of upheaval and of phenomenal growth.
After the economic standstill of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960's and
1970's, reform policies adopted by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980's quadru-
pled the Chinese per capita gross domestic product by the year 2000.16 As part
of its reform, China's government created nongovernmental organizations to in-
teract with international interests and to spur investment in the country. 17 Less
than a decade after its military action on Tiananmen Square, which seemingly
quashed the possibility of individual pursuits, the country began a government-
controlled transition to a market economy.1 8 The country's rapid economic
growth created "astounding disparities in the distribution of wealth, placing
China today among the most unequal nations in the world."' 19 Consequently,
these events have "rendered the current Chinese social and political environment
sensitive, unstable and potentially explosive. Social tensions are now created not
only from aspirations for greater individual and political freedom ... but increas-
ingly from the unequal distribution of wealth and power."'20
At least one commentator has noted that this unequal distribution is the result
of inefficiencies in China's newly established market economy. He notes:
Even if a competitive market might generate a Pareto-efficient allocation
of resources, there are still the cases for government action, because an
efficient allocation of resources might entail great inequality.. . . The
problem is to decide which Pareto-efficient allocation conforms to soci-
ety's notion of distributive justice. Obviously, the market cannot do it.
The social welfare function is simply not a market construct; it must
evolve from the political process. 21
The Chinese government, through recent enactment of meaningful charitable
organization reform, has taken one step toward this elusive distributive justice.
In doing so, it has implicitly bent to its citizens' demands for both greater free-
dom and for a greater stake in the country's wealth. Beginning in the late 1990's,
reform of government-sponsored charitable organizations began to give way to
16 XUDONG ZHANG, WHITHER CHINA? INTELLECTUAL POLITICS OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 9
(Xudong Zhang ed., 2001).
17 Despite their name, the government closely controlled these groups. See Guosheng, supra note 6.
18 See ZHANG, supra note 16.
19 Id. at 11. The author adds,
The polarization between China's richest and poorest regions is considered by economists in
China and worldwide to be not only worse than that of the United States, one of the most
unequal of all advanced capitalist countries, but also on par with such oligarchic or crony-capi-
talist countries such as Russia or Indonesia.
20 Id. at 12.
21 Shaoguang Wang, THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN CHINA 5 (Feb. 8, 2000), http://www.
cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang__files/UNDP.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
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the establishment of truly independent ones.22 While government-sponsored or-
ganizations had confined their operation to fields in harmony with the socialist
ideal, such as women's rights and environmental protection, independent chari-
ties broadened their scope to include migrants, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome ("AIDS"), and legal assistance to the poor. 23  Nonetheless, these
organizations, while permitted to exist, did not have the imprimatur of the Chi-
nese government. 24 As a result they sometimes suffered from "a lack of public
prestige. '25 In fact, fewer than 100,000, or one percent, of China's 10 million
registered companies have records of charitable donations to such charities.
2 6
B. The Portent of SARS
Special regulations, adopted in May 2003, paved the way for the introduction
of substantial changes to public participation in the China's charitable founda-
tions.27 The regulations provided that products, diagnosis, treatment, quarantine
equipment, and vehicles donated by foreign sources for use in the fight against
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ("SARS") could pass to the China Charity
Foundation and the Red Cross Society of China free of import, customs, Value
Added Tax ("VAT"), and consumption taxes. 28 In addition, the State Taxation
Administration announced that companies in China could deduct one hundred
percent of the value of cash and materials donated to combat SARS.29 Generally,
Chinese law limits corporate income tax deductions for charitable contributions
to ten percent of a company's income.30 The SARS measure was a significant
departure from past practices, and it foreshadowed an even greater change to
come.
C. Enactment of the Regulation on Foundation Administration
China's current Regulation on Foundation Administration took effect on June
1, 2004.31 It was adopted to effectuate three much-needed policy goals: to en-
courage the organization and activities of foundations; to maintain the legal
rights and interests of foundations, donors, and beneficiaries; and to promote




26 See Chen Chao, China's Charities and Philanthropists, CHINA INTERNET INFO. CENTER, Apr. 27,
2004, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Apr/94150.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
27 See CIRCULAR OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE ON EXEMPTING THE IMPORT TAXES FOR DONATED
MATERIALS FOR PROPHYLAXIS AND TREATMENT OF CONTAGIOUS ATYPICAL PNEUMONIA (promulgated by
the Ministry of Finance May 2, 2003, effective May 2, 2003), available at LEXIS PRCLEG 2778.
28 See id.
29 Chao, supra note 26.
30 See AUDITING CRITERIA (People's Republic of China), art. 79.
31 REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, (promulgated by the State Council of China, Mar.
8, 2004, effective June, 1, 2004), available at LEXIS PRCLEG 3463.
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public participation in the country's welfare undertaking. 32 As with most of its
market reform policies, the Chinese government has not completely loosened its
grip. All foundations must "abide by the Constitution, laws, statutes, regulations
and the state policy, and shall not endanger the national security, unity, and na-
tional solidarity, and shall not breach social morality. ' 33 Nonetheless, this law
represents a turning point in China's relationship with charitable organizations.
Although its subjective restriction on activities against solidarity and morality
open the door for government intervention should the experiment fail, the Regu-
lation ushers in a new period of respectability for nonprofit organizations that are
not affiliated with the government.
III. Regulatory Regimes: Comparing Chinese and United States Laws
Although starkly different in many ways, the United States and Chinese gov-
ernments share in common the governance of vast and economically potent na-
tions. Both are shepherd market economies, one long established and the other a
promising fledgling. Both are called to fight for the individuals that national
progress leaves behind. Charitable organizations are an important part of these
struggles. China has a decades-long history of seeking social parity for its people
but is inexperienced in governing a market of free actors. On the other hand, the
United States has over two centuries' experience in governing a market of free
actors but has never, as a nation, sought complete social equality for its people.
This dichotomy of experience and increasing unity of economic structure has
produced two systems of charitable governance whose similarities and differ-
ences speak to the similarities and differences of their countries of origin.
A. Organizational Classes
Both China and the United States regulate charitable organizations through use
of a classification system. Under China's Regulation on Foundation Administra-
tion (the "Regulation") "foundation" refers to a nonprofit organization that uses
donated property in pursuance of welfare undertakings. 34 These organizations
are divided into two classes. Public offering foundations solicit contributions
from the general public, and non-public offering foundations are not permitted to
do so.35 Public offering foundations are further divided into national public of-
fering foundations, whose mission and solicitation is national in scope, and re-
gional public offering foundations, whose operation and solicitation is limited to
the state in which the foundation is organized. 36 The tax consequences to donors
32 Id. art. 1.
33 Id. art. 4. The theme of this subjective catch-all prohibition on anti-State activities is repeated in a
separate regulation, which provides that the name of a foundation must not harm state or public interest,
mislead the public, connote superstition, or contain foreign letters or the name of a foreign country; see
PROVISIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF NAMES OF FOUNDATIONS, (promulgated by The Ministry of
Civil Affairs, June 23, 2004, effective June 7, 2004), available at LEXIS PRCLEG 3569.
34 REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 2.
35 Id. art. 3.
36 Id.
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do not appear dependent on the organization's classification, although methods
of governance differ for public and nonpublic foundations. 37
In contrast, the Internal Revenue Code of the United States (the "Code")
names no fewer than twenty-nine individually numbered categories of tax-ex-
empt organizations, most of which serve a public policy goal. 38 These organiza-
tions run the gamut-the catalogue includes everything from instrumentalities of
Congress to social and recreational clubs.39 Tax treatment and regulation of an
organization and its donors depends upon the organization's numerical classifica-
tion.40 The numerical classification system allows the United States government
to tailor legislation to a particular category of organization. 41 This versatile com-
ponent of United States law is an important feature of the Code because the needs
and possible pitfalls of organizations may vary according to their purpose, but it
also adds a level of complexity in governance that is not present in the Chinese
Regulation.
B. Description of Charitable Purpose
Both China and the United States require tax-exempt organizations to serve a
specified purpose. Due to the complexity of United States tax exemption law,
this article will focus on organizations described by section 501(c)(3) of the
Code. These organizations are "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes, or
to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals.. .. 42 This organizational description,
of the twenty-nine enumerated descriptions provided by the Code, appears simi-
lar to the Chinese criterion that foundations "participate in a welfare undertak-
ing. ' ' 43 Although the Chinese Regulation lacks the detail of the United States
provision and does not elaborate on the meaning of "welfare undertaking," pur-
poses of some organizations discussed in English-language articles released
around the effective date of the Regulation are similar to those governed by sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the Code, with the absence of promotion of religion. 44 It is
37 See generally id.
38 See 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3), (d) (2005).
39 See id.
40 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§170, 501, 505 & 511 (2005).
41 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §505 (2005) (establishing anti-discrimination rules for employee benefit
organizations).
42 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3) (2004).
43 REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 1.
44 For instance, Great New Wall for Impoverished University Students provides college scholarships
for rural students. See Tang Yuankai, The More You Give, The More You Get, BEUING REv. June 17,
2004 at 28 (June 2004), available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/ml-zhong/ml-200424-z.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 23, 2005). The Shanghai Education Development Foundation shares a similar mission; see
Chao, supra note 26. Others include Friends of Nature, The China Youth Development Foundation,
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation and the Green Volunteer Association of Chongquing, which
"successfully aroused public concern about forest protection in Sichuan Province, through a TV program
on China Central Television." See also Guosheng, supra note 6. It must be noted, however, that the
promotion of religion is significantly absent from China's accepted "welfare activities."
6 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 3, Issue 1
Comparison of Tax Exempt Organizations
worth noting that the standard set forth in the Regulation is subjective and there-
fore open to interpretation by taxpayers and the government.
C. Incorporation and Federal Recognition Processes
Organizations hoping to benefit from the regulatory framework established for
charities in the United States and in China generally must satisfy several bureau-
cratic requirements before they begin operation. In the United States, organiza-
tions are formed under state law but must also apply for federal recognition of
tax-exempt status if they anticipate receiving annual incomes in excess of
$5,000.45 As a result, organizations are subject to regulation by both federal and
state governments. The federal government monitors tax exempt status, and the
state governments monitor corporate organization and fiduciary use of funds.
46
The Chinese process also embodies national and local components. Although
the entire incorporation and exemption process is a function of national law, it is
carried out at the provincial level.47 The process differs somewhat from that of
the United States because China does not have independent state governments.48
As a result, the national government has a constant hand in governing all aspects
of charitable compliance, and for that reason, it has a potential organizational
advantage over the United States in matters of charitable oversight.
A recent proposal of the Senate Finance Committee (the "Committee") sug-
gests the United States may move to eliminate this discrepancy by assigning fed-
eral prosecutorial power to the states in exchange for assumption of traditional
state business oversight powers. 49 Under the proposal, "[s]tates would be pro-
vided the authority to pursue certain Federal tax law violations by exempt organi-
zations with approval of the IRS."'50 In addition, the proposal would impose
federal best corporate practices on charities. 51 This is an area traditionally re-
served to state governance, and the proposal, if adopted, would be a significant
affront to federalist principals. Under it, the Code would go so far as to prescribe
45 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 13, at 11; IRS, 2004 Form 1023 Instructions at 2,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2005) [hereinafter IRS Form 1023
Instructions].
46 See PANEL ON THE NoN-PROFrr SECTOR, supra note 4, at 13.
47 See REGULATION OF FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, arts. 9-19 (public offering
foundation established through application to provincial business supervisory authority and administra-
tive department of registration).
48 See OwEN D. NEE ET. AL., BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 957-2nd
T.M.I(B) (2004).
49 See SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, TAX EXEMPT GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS: STAFF DISCUSSION
DRAFT 7 (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/sitepages/2004HearingF.htm/hear-
ings2004.htm (follow "Tax Exempt Governance Proposals: Staff Discussion Draft" hyperlink) [hereinaf-
ter SENATE FINANCE COMMrIrEE DISCUSSION DRAFr] (last visited Oct. 23, 2005); see also PANEL ON THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 4, at 4. (recommending creation of a federally funded program to help
states increase oversight and education and urging elimination of statutory barriers to information sharing
between the IRS and the states).
50 SENATE FINANCE COMMrITEE DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 49, at 7.
51 See id. at 11-15.
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the number of directors a charity might have.52 This is strikingly similar to the
Chinese law.53 In addition, the proposal would grant the IRS power to remove
board members, officers, or employees of a charity who violate "self-dealing
rules, conflicts of interest, excess benefit transaction rules, private inurnment
rules, or charitable solicitation laws."'54 Charitable solicitation laws traditionally
have been state laws. 55 The federal government's assumption of solicitation
monitoring would further blur the line between state and federal enforcement of
charitable law and bring the United States system of charity creation and govern-
ance into agreement with the Chinese system. This is a surprising result given
that China's government is national while the United States government is
federal.
D. Tax Benefits to Donors
China and the United States both impose limits on the amount of charitable
contributions that individuals and corporations may deduct for income tax pur-
poses. These limitations reveal something of each nation's political culture. In
China, limitations are based on the recipient. 56 Corporations and individuals are
entitled to unlimited dollar for dollar (or, more appropriately, Yuan for Yuan)
deductions for their contributions made for the purpose of national defense or
troop support;57 however, deductions for contributions to charitable organizations
are limited to ten percent of income for corporations and twenty percent of in-
come for individuals. 58
Conversely, the United States draws no distinction among charitable recipients
based on national defense. Contributions to organizations described in section
501(c)(3) of the Code are equally deductible regardless of the charitable purpose
those organizations serve. 59 Instead, the main limitation imposed on donors
within the United States stems from their income.60 An individual donor gener-
ally may not claim charitable deductions in excess of fifty percent of income, and
a corporate donor may not claim charitable deductions in excess of ten percent of
income. 61 In addition, deductions for the nation's wealthiest individual donors
are further reduced by an amount that is equal to the lesser of three percent of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income or eighty percent of the taxpayer's otherwise
52 Id. at 13.
53 See REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 20.
54 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 49, at 13-14.
55 See Multi-State Filer Project, STANDARDIZED REGISTRATION FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
(2004), http://www.multistatefiling.org/index.html for an example of the Unified Registration Statement,
which is submitted to states and requires detailed information on an organization's solicitation activities.
56 See REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 27.
57 See AUDITING CRITERIA (People's Republic of China), art. 79.
58 See AUDITING CRITERIA (China), art. 79; INCOME TAX LAW (China), art. 17.
59 See generally 26 U.S.C. §170 (2005).
60 See 26 U.S.C. §170(b) (2005).
61 See id. Note that in some instances, donors' deductions are limited to 30% or 20% of their ad-
justed gross income.
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allowable itemized deductions. 62 The Chinese law does not yet impose similar
restrictions.63
E. The Private Foundation Difference
Unlike their Chinese counterparts, tax deductions available to United States
donors may be further limited to twenty or thirty percent of the donor's income if
the donee is a "private foundation" that does not meet certain requirements. 64 A
private foundation is one that receives a substantial portion of its funding from a
single source or a few sources. 65 Organizations with this funding structure are
more susceptible to tax abuse than those that are funded by the general public. 66
As a result, they must abide by stricter rules than those applicable to publicly-
funded charities. 67 These rules include restrictions on dealings between the foun-
dation, its substantial contributors and its managers, annual distribution require-
ments, rules against holding substantial equity positions in companies, rules
against investments that jeopardize the foundation's charitable purpose, and
stricter requirements regarding permissible donees. 68
Like the United States, China has established separate systems of governance
for private and public foundations. 69 Many provisions of the Regulation approxi-
mate those of United States private foundation law; however, some provisions
which would only apply to private foundations in the United States apply to both
private and public foundations in China.70 In essence, the Chinese system sub-
jects all charities, and not just those with limited sources of funding, to stricter
rules of governance than those that apply to United States publicly funded
charities.
F. Restrictions on Conduct of Charities
Despite their comparative flexibility, basic restrictions applicable to United
States charities are easily characterized and clearly defined. Four universal rules
apply to all United States charities described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code.
62 26 U.S.C. §68(a) (2004). In 2005, the §68 limitation only applied to individuals whose adjusted
gross income exceeds $145,950. Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970. This limitation will be gradu-
ally reduced over a five-year period beginning in 2005 and completely eliminated in 2010 per §68(0,
however, the limitation will return full force in 2011 unless Congress acts to counter the sunset provision
contained in §901 of Public Law No. 107-16.
63 See generally REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION supra note 31.
64 26 U.S.C. §170(b)(1)(E) (2005).
65 26 U.S.C. §509 (2004).
66 See TURNEY P. BERRY, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS-SELF-DEALING (Section 4941), 879-2nd T.M.
I(A) (2004) (stating "the provisions of Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, were intended to curb certain perceived abuses involving private charitable
foundations.").
67 See id.
68 See 26 U.S.C. §§4940-45 (2005).
69 See generally REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31.
70 Id.
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First, a charity must be operated exclusively for a public purpose. 7 1 Next, none
of a charity's net earnings may inure to the benefit of any individual who is not a
charitable beneficiary.72 This generally means that a charity may not provide
excessive compensation for goods and services, and upon dissolution of a chari-
table organization, its assets must be transferred to another charity.73 Third, "no
substantial part" of the charity's activities can be the "carrying on of propaganda"
or attempting to influence legislation, and the organization may not campaign on
behalf of political candidates.74 Finally, the organization must not conduct activ-
ities that violate public policy. 75 Whether an activity violates public policy is
judged by reference to the laws and pronouncements of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the government. 7
6
China's law does not contain counterparts to these United States provisions,
although they may be inferred from some parts of the Regulation. For instance, a
foundation is required to engage in welfare activities according to its charter, and
the foundation's charter must not "specify contents that are beneficial to a special
natural person, legal person, or other organization. '77 Taken together, these pro-
visions may have similar substantive effects as the United States' ban on private
inurement and its requirement of operation exclusively for a public purpose.
Nonetheless, those rules are not explicit in the Regulation, and it is unclear
whether a charitable organization in China might be permitted latitude to perform
those activities disallowed to United States organizations.
Stricter rules apply in other areas. The Regulation contains many generally
applicable operating provisions that affect only private foundations under the
Code. First, foundations in China are required to make prudent and productive
investments of donated funds. 78 This rule is reminiscent of the jeopardizing in-
vestment restriction applicable to private foundations in the United States, which
imposes a five percent tax on certain investments that are inconsistent with the
organization's charitable purpose.7 9 Next, the Regulation requires a public offer-
71 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3) (2005).
72 Id.
73 See generally Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm'r, 823 F.2d 1310 (1987) (church which
transferred over two million dollars directly to church founder, who controlled all of church's funds, was
not exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Code because its actions resulted in private inurnment); IRS
Form 1023 Instructions, supra note 45, at 8-9.
74 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3) (2005).
75 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
76 See generally id. at 600-02 (court reviewed legislative, executive, and judicial authority to deter-
mine whether the IRS exceeded its authority.).
77 REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, arts. 5, 10. Interestingly, this pro-
vision seems to ban supporting organizations, which have commonly been employed in the United States
to provide monetary support to civic leagues and other charitable organizations; see 26 U.S.C. §509(a)(3)
(2004) where recent investigation into charitable organizations has revealed that supporting organizations
are particularly susceptible to abuse, and recently proposed amendments to United States law have called
for their elimination; see Senate Finance Committee Discussion Draft, supra note 49, at 2.
78 See REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, arts. 25, 27.
79 See 26 U.S.C. §4944(1)(a) (2004) (that provides, "[i]f a private foundation invests any amount in
such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes, there is hereby imposed on
the making of such investment a tax ...").
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ing foundation to make welfare expenditures that meet or exceed seventy percent
of its income from the prior year.80 Non-public offering foundations must make
welfare expenditures that meet or exceed eight percent of their prior year's total
net asset value.81 Again, private foundations in the United States are subject to
similar minimum expenditure rules. A foundation that fails to make welfare dis-
tributions in excess of five percent of the net value of assets not used directly in
carrying out the foundation's exempt purpose is subject to a fifteen percent ex-
cise tax on the undistributed amount.82
The Regulation diverges from the Code on the subject of administrative ex-
penses. It provides that "[t]he wages and welfare of the staff of a foundation and
the expenses of administration shall not exceed 10% of the total expenditure of
the current year."8' 3 In contrast, the United States places no limit on administra-
tive expenses. 84 Instead, "reasonable and necessary" administrative costs are
considered part of the foundation's charitable giving.8 5 Although a limitation
was briefly imposed in the United States, an IRS study published in 1990 found
that most foundations' charitable expenditures far exceeded their administrative
ones. 86 Congress never renewed the limitation; however, recent investigations
into the activities of charitable organizations have spurred a new proposed limita-
tion.87 The new limitation would apply only to private foundations and would
call for an automatic IRS investigation of administrative expenses in excess of
ten percent of the foundation's total expenses.8 8 Any expenses above thirty-five
percent of the foundation's total expenses would be considered per se unreasona-
ble. 89 It is worth noting for comparison purposes that if the proposed limitation
were passed, both the United States and China would use ten percent as the
benchmark of acceptable charitable administration cost.
G. Related Person Restrictions
China's rules on related persons in foundation management are more restric-
tive than the corresponding United States provisions. 90 In China, foundations are
required to have boards of directors composed of five to twenty-five individu-
80 REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 29.
81 Id.
82 See 26 U.S.C. §4942 (2004).
83 REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 29.
84 Section 4942(g)(4) of the Code used to limit the amount of administrative expenses counted as
nontaxable "qualifying distributions." This limitation expired in 1990. See 26 U.S.C. §4942(g)(4)(F)
(2004).
85 26 U.S.C. §4942(g)(1)(A) (2004).
86 See THOMAS J. SCHENKELBERG, ESQ. AND VIRGINIA C. GROSS, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS - DISTRIBU-
TIONS (§4942), 880 2nd TMP III(J)(2) (2004), citing IRS Grant-Making Administrative Expenses Study
(Jan. 27, 1990).
87 See SENATE FINANCE COMMrIrTEE DISCUSSION DRAFr, supra note 49, at 5.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, ch. III.
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als.91 Only one third of the directors may receive compensation for their ser-
vices.92 In non-public offering foundations that are created with private funds,
"[I]f some of the directors thereof are close relatives, the total number thereof
shall not exceed one third of the total number of directors. The directors of other
foundations who are close relatives shall not hold a post concurrently [on the
board of directors]. '93 In addition, an interested director (meaning one whose
affairs outside of the foundation will be affected by the board's decision on a
particular matter) is not permitted to participate in decisions related to the rele-
vant interest.94 Finally, directors and supervisors of the foundation, and the close
relatives of those individuals, are flatly forbidden to engage in transactions with
the foundation they serve.
95
These restrictions on related persons are similar in nature to disqualified per-
son rules applicable to private foundations found in the Code. Although there is
no prohibition against relatives serving as co-directors of private foundations,
"self-dealing" transactions with "disqualified persons" are heavily taxed.96 Dis-
qualified persons include a substantial contributor to the foundation, officers and
directors of the foundation, a relative of a substantial contributor, officer or direc-
tor, or finally a business in which a substantial contributor, officer or director
owns more than a thirty-five percent stake.97 "Self-dealing" transactions include
a sale or lease of property, lending or borrowing money, furnishing goods and
services, payment of compensation by the foundation, and transfer of foundation
property to the disqualified person.98
An excise tax may also apply to managers and employees of United States
public charities who enter into questionable compensation arrangements. 99 The
tax applies to any "disqualified person" who receives a benefit from a charity in
excess of the value of goods or services provided to the charity by that person. 100
The definition of disqualified persons for purposes of the excise tax on public
charities is similar to that used for private foundations and generally includes any
person who is able to exercise financial control over the organization.' 0 ' It also
applies to any manager who approved the excess benefit transaction. 10 2
The Code contains exceptions to the self-dealing rules for those transactions
that benefit the foundation and do not benefit the disqualified person.'0 3 In addi-
91 Id. art. 20.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. art. 23.
95 Id.
96 See 26 U.S.C. §4941 (2004).
97 26 U.S.C. §4946(a)(1) (2004).
98 26 U.S.C. §4941(d)(1) (2004).
99 26 U.S.C. §4958 (2004).
100 26 U.S.C. §4958(a)(1) (2005).
101 26 U.S.C. §4958(f)(1) (2005).
102 Compare 26 U.S.C. §4958(a)(2) with 26 U.S.C. §4946(a)(1).
103 See 26 U.S.C. §4941(d)(2) (2005).
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tion, the United States tax regulations permit a private foundation or a public
charity to pay a reasonable salary to directors and officers for services rendered
in pursuit of the organization's charitable purpose. 04 As a result, governance of
related person transactions in the private foundation context is in some ways less
restrictive than its Chinese counterpart. China flatly forbids foundation managers
from engaging in transactions with the foundations that they serve, while the
United States allows all such transactions but subjects those that endanger the
integrity of the foundation to a prohibitive excise tax.
Recently proposed amendments to the tax law in the United States would
bring its content much closer to that of China's law.105 In particular, the Com-
mittee has suggested that self-dealing rules should apply to all charitable organi-
zations, whether public or private. 10 6 In addition, the proposal would expand the
definition of "disqualified person" to include a corporation or partnership with
respect to which an otherwise disqualified person "is a person of substantial in-
fluence." 107 The Committee's proposal would flatly forbid compensation of a
private foundation's directors, and it would limit compensation of a public char-
ity's directors to "comparable federal government rates for similar work and sim-
ilar time to support salary.' 10 8 These changes, if put into effect, would make the
United States' system of charitable governance quite similar to China's. Both
countries would limit the influence and compensation of interested persons in
charitable organizations and strongly discourage self-dealing transactions.
H. Annual Reporting and Government Oversight
The Committee's proposal would also draw the United States closer to China
in its' oversight of charitable activities. Currently, U.S. charities with annual
income in excess of $25,000 are required to file a report with the IRS and must
make the report publicly available for inspection.10 9 In the absence of an audit,
this report serves as the sum total of the federal government's oversight of chari-
table organizations. States generally follow the same procedure, and most states'
laws do not give government agencies the right to participate in foundation
activities.
In contrast, China supervises foundations directly. 110 Foundations are re-
quired to appoint "supervisors" who must attend board meetings and "reflect in-
formation to the administrative departments of registration, business supervisory
authority, and tax authorities or the accounting department in charge.""'1 In ad-
104 See Treas. Regs. §53.4941(d)-3(c) (as amended in 1980); Treas. Regs. §53.4958-4 (as amended in
2002).
105 See generally SENATE FINANCE COMMITrEE DISCUSSION DRAFr, supra note 49.
106 Id. at 3-5.
107 Id. at 4.
108 Id. at 5.
109 See Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ 1, 8, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
i990-ez.pdf.
110 See generally REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31.
1"1 Id. art. 22.
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dition, various provincial government offices are directed by statute to annually
inspect foundation offices, direct and supervise foundation activities, and review
annual reports. 112 Furthermore, foundations are required to "accept the tax su-
pervision and the accounting supervision by the competent departments of taxa-
tion and the competent accounting departments."'1 3 These powers are much
broader than those imposed by either federal or state governments in the United
States and reflect a strong difference in political culture between the two coun-
tries. Finally, illegal acts by a Chinese foundation can result not only in cancella-
tion of the foundation's existence but also in criminal punishment. 114 This
provision is no small matter in a country that recently executed four bankers for
fraud and embezzlement.1 1 5
Il. Analysis of Compared Laws
From two extremes of political culture, the United States and China have
nearly reached consensus, at least on paper, of the appropriate method of gov-
erning charitable organizations. This agreement is hardly surprising, given
China's push for rapid marketization and the United States' slow drift from a
truly federal government toward a national system. The recent vintage of
China's law, in comparison to the long history of relevant the Code sections,
suggests that Chinese lawmakers may have something to learn from the relative
complexity of the United States system. On the other hand, revelation about the
prevalence of fraud among charitable organizations in the United States has pro-
duced a proposal from the Committee that would shift United States law strongly
in the direction of Chinese-style governance.
A. Recommendations for Revision of the Code Based on a Comparison to
the Regulation of the People's Republic of China
The United States' governance of charitable organizations is more permissive
than China's governance in several important ways. Charitable institutions in
China are required to distribute a minimum percentage of either their income or
the value of their assets each year. 116 In the United States, only private founda-
tions are subject to a minimum distribution rule, and this rule requires only distri-
bution of a percentage of the value of the charity's assets not used in furtherance
of its exempt purpose rather than a percentage of the value of all of the charity's
assets. 117 In addition, China requires charities to minimize expenses of adminis-
tration. 118 The United States places no limit on those expenses.119 China also
112 See id. arts. 34-36.
113 Id. art. 37.
114 See id. arts. 40-45.
115 Jiang Zhuqing, Financial Crooks Get Tough Penalty, CHINA DAIY, 2004 WL 89401066 (Sept.
2004).
116 See REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 29.
117 See 26 U.S.C. §4942 (2004).
118 REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 29.
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flatly forbids all charitable directors from transacting business with the founda-
tions that they serve.120 The United States limits these transactions only for pri-
vate foundations, and only in certain instances.1 21 Finally, China takes a more
hands-on approach to supervision of charities, employing annual on-site visits
and permissive government intervention in charities' operations as a means of
oversight.122 In contrast, the United States requires only an annual report.1
23
The results of the United States' hands-off approach to charitable foundations
cannot be summarized easily. The nonprofit sector is notably varied and controls
vast resources.' 24 It plays a vital role in the social, economic and moral lives of
United States citizens) 25 It seems likely that the country's relaxed method of
oversight has contributed to the growth and importance of charitable institutions,
which is no doubt a blessing rather than a curse. Nonetheless, the Committee's
recent investigation revealed that some charities have paid inflated salaries to
executives, participated in insider deals without adequate transparency, engaged
in abusive tax shelters, and funneled money to terrorist organizations. 126 Senator
Max Baucus denounced the behavior as "sloppy, unethical and criminal."'127
Selective adoption of China's stricter methods of governance could improve
charitable oversight in the United States. Many of China's proposals are tailored
to maximize use of charitable foundations' assets for charitable work, while
many of the problems cited by the Committee center on use of those assets for
purposes unrelated to charitable work. It is no surprise, then, that the Commit-
tee's proposed remedy bears many similarities to China's law. Like China's
Regulation, the Committee's proposal would limit administrative expenses, place
restrictions on the dealings of foundation directors, and give the IRS greater
oversight power.
119 See SCHENKELBERG, supra note 86.
120 See REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 23.
121 See 26 U.S.C. §4941 (2004).
122 See generally REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31.
123 See Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ 1, 8, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
i990-ez.pdf.
124 See JoINr COMMTTraE ON TAXATION, supra note 13.
125 Baucus Remarks, supra note 15.
126 See id.; see also Written Statement of Mark W. Everson Commissioner of Internal Revenue Before
the Committee on Finance United States Senate Hearing on Exempt Organizations: Enforcement
Problems, Accomplishments, and Future Direction 5-14, Apr. 5, 2005, available at http://finance.senate.
govlhearings/testimony2OO5test/metestO4O505.pdf (detailing abuses of tax exempt status by charitable
organizations).
127 Baucus Remarks, supra note 15. For example, a committee was recently formed to investigate the
Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation on charges that the foundation had misled donors about its
financial condition in order to raise funds and on charges that it paid unjustifiably high salaries to its
executives; see Fred Stokeld, Review Committee Releases Findings on Statue of Liberty Charity; Finance
Committee Probe Continues, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 149-3 (Aug. 2, 2004). The executive salary con-
troversy is not isolated-there have been a number of high profile investigations in recent months. For
one example, see Study Finds Some Charities Pay "Astronomical Compensation" Packages, 2004 TAX
NoTEs TODAY 163-52 (Aug. 20, 2004) (noting that compensation packages paid to executives of the
Greenpeace supporting organization, Greenpeace Fund, "appear to be entirely inappropriate considering
the organization performs essentially no work.").
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Even with those recommendations in place, the Committee's recommendation
does not approach the Regulation in terms of simplicity and potential effective-
ness. Using the Regulation as an example, the United States should consider
enacting simple limits on administrative expenses, directors' salaries, and mini-
mum grant distributions. These measures would not only help good charitable
actors who are unsatisfied with the ambiguous state of current law, they would
also reduce funds available for malfeasance by boards of directors gone awry. In
addition, simple numerical limits would enhance the IRS's enforcement function
by making annual charitable foundation reports more meaningful to reviewing
agents. Although adopting this recommendation will not solve all of the United
States' charitable governance problems, it will ensure that, in the absence of out-
right fraud, charitable organizations will report instances when their executives'
salaries and administrative expenses exceed an acceptable level and when grants
for their charitable purposes fall below an acceptable level. This bright-line pro-
posal would seem to be an effective check on even marginally law-abiding
boards of directors.
B. Recommendations for Revision of the Regulation Based on a Comparison
to Internal Revenue Code
The Code is both more and less detailed than the Regulation. Although it
prescribes the many minutiae of incorporation, capitalization, and report filing of
charitable foundations, the Regulation fails to anticipate the fine details of tax-
payer ingenuity now covered by the Code. Because the United States Congress
has spent decades observing and correcting various forms of tax-exempt organi-
zation abuse, the Code's anti-abuse provisions, particularly those relating to ex-
cess benefit transactions and private foundations, are extraordinarily complex.
Although this complexity is an obvious detriment to charitable organizations (and
a boon to their attorneys), it serves an important purpose. Without it, United
States charitable foundations would be open to personal use rather than exclu-
sively public use. For China, whose forceful reform policy has already en-
couraged corporate graft and whose citizenry harbors only shallow support for
privately run institutions, abuse of tax-exempt organizations will no doubt be-
come a serious matter as use of those organizations becomes more widespread. 128
The Code differs from the Regulation in several key respects. First, the Code
clearly enunciates and categorizes the various purposes of tax-exempt organiza-
tions. 129 This enables Congress to legislate specifically and narrowly to a partic-
ular kind of organization when necessary. It also enables the founders and
directors of organizations to properly tailor their purposes and activities to those
that are sanctioned by the Code. China, in contrast, requires only a "welfare
undertaking" that does not jeopardize national security, solidarity, or morality. 130
In doing so, it loses the legislative ease retained by Congress to target particular
16 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 3, Issue 1
128 See ZHANG, supra note 16.
129 See 26 U.S.C. 501(c) (2004).
130 REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, arts. 2, 4.
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kinds of organizations. In addition, the Regulation's subjective description of
charitable purpose makes the government appear less than genuine in its encour-
agement of independent organizations. The standards of national security, soli-
darity, and morality would seem to prevent a charitable organization from
undertaking any task in contravention of current government thinking. 131 In ar-
eas prone to controversy, such as foreign adoption, migration, and ethnic preser-
vation, the Regulation's subjective stance could have a serious chilling effect on
charitable activity because it seems to allow the government to eliminate any
charity at will.
To avoid inhibiting charitable undertakings, the Chinese government should
outline a policy similar to that described by the United States Supreme Court in
Bob Jones University v. United States.132 In that case, the Court looked to all
three branches of the government in order to determine whether racial discrimi-
nation at an educational institution ran counter to the common-law rule against
granting tax-exemption to organizations that, through their actions, violate public
policy. 133 China, too, should look to existing written expressions of law and
policy preference, which could serve as a foothold for charitable organizers and
courts in instances of dispute.
Another difference between the Code and the Regulations comes in the area of
related person transactions. The Regulation limits the number of "close rela-
tives" who may serve as directors of a private offering foundation.1 34 It also
prohibits directors from participating in decisions on matters of personal financial
interest to them.135 Finally, it prohibits business transactions between directors
or their close relatives and the foundation they serve. 136 These provisions are
broader than corresponding provisions of the Code because the Regulation's pro-
visions apply to all charities while the Code's provisions apply only to private
foundations. Nonetheless, the Code provisions contain an important level of de-
tail that is absent in the Regulation.
The Regulation restricts its concept of a disqualified person to foundation di-
rectors and supervisors. The Code, in contrast, looks not only to a charitable
organization's management but also to those who may be in a position of influ-
ence, for instance, after making substantial contributions to the foundation.1 37
There is no doubt that even in the United States, charities must be responsive to
131 China's Ministry of Culture has used similar standard to rule by fiat in the past year, requiring
Britney Spears to wear less revealing clothing during concerts given in the country and banning as "an
insult to national dignity" a Nike television commercial featuring NBA star LeBron James as a character
in a kung-fu movie; see Britney Given Green Light on China Tour, China Daily, June 1, 2004, at 1,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-O6/01/content_335591.htm; see China Bans
Nike TV Ad as National Insult, China Daily, Feb. 12, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/english/doc/2004-12/07/content_397920.htm.
132 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
133 Id. at 600-02.
134 See REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 20.
135 Id. art. 23.
136 Id.
137 See 26 U.S.C. §4946(a)(1) (2004); Treas. Regs. §53.4958-3(c).
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the wishes of their high-dollar donors. The Code restriction exists to keep this
responsiveness within reasonable bounds. The failure of China's law to compre-
hend the influence of substantial contributors leaves open the possibility of abu-
sive quid pro quo transactions with wealthy taxpayers who are not foundation
directors.
In addition to targeting managers and substantial contributors, the Code also
prohibits foundations from dealing with businesses that are heavily influenced by
the foundation's managers and substantial contributors. 138 The Regulation seems
not to contain any corresponding provision. 139 This second omission is also im-
portant. With China's increasing privatization, the number of wealthy individu-
als who hold ownership interests in businesses will grow. By not prohibiting
transactions between these businesses and charitable foundations directed by re-
lated business owners, the Regulation opens the door to an income tax shelter
that has been outlawed in the United States by the private foundation regulations.
Under the Regulation, a wealthy business owner could create a private offering
foundation by donating a sum of money to it. One-third of the directors could be
close relatives of the founder, and one third of the directors could draw a salary
from the foundation.1 40 Under the Regulation, the foundation's investment earn-
ings would not be subject to income tax. 141 Furthermore, although the founder
and his close relatives would be prohibited from transacting business with the
foundation, their corporation would not be subject to a similar prohibition. Al-
though the founder would be somewhat restricted in his dealing with the founda-
tion, he would still have two viable and important avenues of withdrawing his
appreciated donation: directors' salaries and transactions with his corporation.
Thus, the Regulations should define the term "close relative" to include busi-
nesses owned in specific percentages by foundation directors and contributors in
order to prevent the shelter described above.
One final and important difference between the Regulation and the Code is the
approach of both laws to government oversight. The Regulation currently calls
for a very high level of government involvement in the administration of charita-
ble foundations.' 42 The Chinese government is required to inspect foundation
offices annually, to engage in "routine supervision and administration," to ex-
amine the foundation's annual report, and to provide special tax and accounting
supervision.1 43 The Code does not call for a similar level of government involve-
ment. Instead, it requires the IRS to review an annual return and to conduct
investigation of that return if necessary.44
138 Id.
139 The term "close relative" is not defined in the Regulation. I have assumed that it refers to family
members.
140 REGULATION ON FOUNDATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, art. 20.
141 See id.
142 See id. at ch. V.
143 Id.
144 26 U.S.C. §6033 (LEXIS through 2004).
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Although the United States may be moving toward a more hands-on approach
to governing charities, it is unlikely to reach the level required by the Chinese
regulation. 45 Even if there were a political will to scrutinize each and every
charitable organization in the United States, the IRS simply lacks the resources to
do so. 146 In 2003, the IRS was responsible for policing 1.6 million exempt orga-
nizations. 147 If China's new Regulation encourages growth of its nonprofit sec-
tor on par with that of the United States, its bureaucracy will be overwhelmed.
Both countries should consider adopting a system of oversight that combines
elements of both the Code and the Regulation. This hybrid method should em-
ploy a meaningful reporting system that would require submission of a founda-
tion's audited financial statements, bank records, and managers' affidavits in
order to identify charitable organizations at risk under the law. The governments
could then focus their attention on those organizations, employing on-site visits,
and special guidance when appropriate. By using a hybrid oversight statute,
China could learn from the United States' experience and avoid prevalent misuse
of charitable organizations without overwhelming its bureaucratic system. Like-
wise, the United States could move toward a more effective system of
governance.
In summary, there are useful lessons to be learned on both sides. The United
States should consider adopting bright-line minimum distribution and maximum
administrative expenditure requirements to encourage an appropriate level of
grant-making and to provide the IRS with meaningful guidelines for assessment.
Such guidelines would allow the IRS to follow China's example and increase on-
site oversight where organizations' returns indicate potential problems. China
should likewise rely upon organizations' annual reports for guidance as to the
appropriate level of on-site oversight in order to avoid overwhelming local bu-
reaucracies as the country's charitable sector expands. In addition, China should
adopt a more objective standard of charitable purpose, which would create free-
dom and promote the establishment of charities tailored to needs of China's peo-
ple, whether or not the government recognizes those needs. Finally, in order to
prevent taxpayer abuse, China should adopt the United States' disqualified per-
son definition, which has been crafted over a long period of time in response to
known taxpayer behaviors.
145 See Evelyn Brody, Submission in Response to June 2004 Discussion Draft of the Senate Finance
Committee Staff Regarding Proposed Reforms Affecting Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2004 TAX NoTEs
TODAY 143-92 (July 26, 2004) (suggesting that increased IRS powers and privatization of charitable
oversight are not desirable because current laws suffice); Mark Pacella, Statement of the National Associ-
ation of State Charity Officials to the United States Senate, Committee on Finance; 2004 TAX NoTEs
TODAY 121-37 (June 23, 2004) (supporting increased reporting requirements and information sharing
with state regulators); Derek Bok, Statement to Senate Finance Committee, 2004 TAX NoTEs TODAY
121-36 (June 22, 2004) (urging that "excessive administrative burdens may well outweigh the positive
results that a more cautious, incremental approach can achieve").
146 See Fred Stokfeld, EO Reps Respond to Finance Draft of Charity Reform Proposals, 2004 TAX
NoTEs TODAY 142-1 (July 22, 2004).
147 See JCT Describes Current Law on Exempt Organizations, 2004 TAX NoTmS TODAY 121-9 (June
22, 2004).
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IV. Conclusion
While the United States and China have divergent political cultures, they are
both faced with the difficult task of governing large economies. Both have real-
ized that the nonprofit sector plays an important role in such economies, and both
have developed comprehensive systems of oversight for charitable organizations.
The United States' past experience has provided it with a detailed set of require-
ments but a hands-off style of enforcement. China, in contrast, has had little
experience with preventing taxpayer manipulation in a market economy, so its
law is weak in detail but strong on enforcement.
In spite of these differences, the similarity of the two laws, and the strikingly
Chinese proposal of the Committee, paint a picture of two countries moving to-
ward the center on issues of charitable governance. The United States has
adopted stricter laws, as well as a more national and less federal view of charita-
ble organizations. China has become more permissive, giving its imprimatur to
nongovernmental charitable institutions for the first time in over forty years.
Both have reached an understanding on the importance of altruism in organized
form, and both societies should benefit from their newly-found common ground.
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